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Abstract
We consider the problem of detecting malware with deep learning models, where the malware may be
combined with significant amounts of benign code. Examples of this include piggybacking and trojan horse
attacks on a system, where malicious behavior is hidden within a useful application. Such added flexibility
in augmenting the malware enables significantly more code obfuscation. Hence we focus on the use of
static features, particularly Intents, Permissions, and API calls, which we presume cannot be ultimately
hidden from the Android system, but only augmented with yet more such features. We first train a deep
neural network classifier for malware classification using features of benign and malware samples. Then
we demonstrate a steep increase in false negative rate (i.e., attacks succeed), simply by randomly adding
features of a benign app to malware. Finally we test the use of data augmentation to harden the classifier
against such attacks. We find that for API calls, it is possible to reject the vast majority of attacks, where
using Intents or Permissions is less successful.
1 Introduction
A number of technologies are available to attackers which can make the automated detection of malware difficult.
Code obfuscation techniques can be used to circumvent conventional signature-based detection approaches.
This includes simple techniques such as encryption methods for protecting intellectual property [20], as well as
increasingly-sophisticated ways to change code without altering its function [24]. The rapid appearance and
sheer volume of new malware variants has prompted the use of machine learning approaches to keep up [15].
Initial machine learning approaches utilized expert feature engineering, by first using tools to extract important
features. Then shallow classification methods such as support vector machines were applied to distinguish
malware from benign apps, and various types of static or dynamic features were compared [19].
More recent research has utilized deep learning, which is able to learn important features from large and
unstructured datasets [11, 1, 12, 10, 22]. Deep Learning models have been applied to traditional static and/or
dynamic features [6, 7]. Deep networks are also applied directly on the bytecode or decompiled code [22, 14],
utilizing techniques for processing sequences such as from natural language processing [1, 12], or convolutional
neural nets [11, 8, 3], which has also been prominently applied to sequences and text. Typically, these archi-
tectures exact features based on short sequences of instructions, making them again vulnerable to sufficiently-
sophisticated obfuscation techniques which reorder code into new sequences.
A related area of deep learning research involves adversarial examples [18]. Most famously, this entails
a imperceptibly-small perturbation of an image which causes an otherwise accurate deep neural network to
classify it incorrectly. Adversarial example research has been extended to other data types [21], including
malware [17]. For malware, the problem is essentially the same as code obfuscation under the constraint that the
adjustment to the malware file must be kept small and not affect functionality [9]. This has been demonstrated
with classification based on static or dynamic features [6, 7], as well as sequence data [17]. There has also
been significant research on hardening deep learning against adversarial attacks [13, 6, 7, 23, 4]. One of the
most prominent approaches is a form of data augmentation called “adversarial training”, where the network is
simply trained using correctly-labeled adversarial malware samples. Nonetheless, the attacks used in adversarial
example research are not necessarily realistic [5], due to the artificial constraints on perturbation-size.
In this paper we will address malware obfuscation involving large alternations to both size and function, by
allowing the addition of benign features to the malware. First we train a dense network to classify malware.
Then we demonstrate the effect of obfuscation by randomly adding features from benign samples, which causes
a large increase in false negative rate (i.e. the obfuscation succeeds). Lastly we demonstrate the improvement
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gained by training with obfuscated samples, where the original performance can be nearly achieved with the
proper choice of feature types.
2 Results
2.1 Data Collection and Preprocessing
We used the AndroParse dataset [16] consisting of approximately 90k Apps, 60k benign and 30k malicious.
AndroParse extracts a variety of features including API’s, Intents, Permissions, which we used in this re-
search. The dataset contained 3438 unique intents and 19,827 unique permissions which were used as features.
A set of API calls was formed by extracting all function calls, then removing the function name and recur-
sively truncating the class hierarchy (e.g., com.google.android.gms.internal.zztn.zzbS was broken into
com.google.android.gms.internal.zztn, com.google.android.gms.internal, com.google.android.gms,
and com.google.android). Finally the most common 20k elements were chosen from this set to use as features.
After discarding a small number of samples for which there were zero features, we ultimately had 89,678 samples
with 61,180 benign and 28,498 malicious.
The samples were randomly shuffled, then 30 percent were selected for the test set and 70 percent for the
training set. As we did not perform early-stopping or extensive parameter tuning (see next section), the test
set was also used as the validation set during training to demonstrate convergence.
2.2 Network Architecture
We ultimately used a network consisting of 20 dense layers with 1024 nodes each, plus a single-node output
layer to form the binary classifier. We did not experience any noticeable overfitting or a need for careful
hyperparameter selection. So we simply chose a dense architecture with standard optimization settings, finding
essentially the same results as for variations on the architecture. The network was implemented in Keras
[2] (version 2.2.4-tf) with TensorFlow backend (verson 2.0.0) on a NVidia 2080ti GPU. The model summary
generated by Keras is given in the appendix for the case when all feature types were used. As noted above, we
considered various architectures formed via a stack of deep layers. While it was evident that a deep network
performed better than a shallow network, doubling or halving the depth of the deep network did not affect results
noticeably. This was despite the fact that there were far more trainable parameters than training samples for
the baseline test, suggesting that most of the samples were easy to discriminate. A relatively complex network
was chosen to allow for additional adaptability in the subsequent training with obfuscated data, where there
would effectively be unlimited training samples due to data augmentation.
Typical network settings were used: binary cross-entropy loss, rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation on
hidden layers, sigmoid activation on final layer, stochastic gradient descent (learning rate 0.1) with Nesterov
momentum (rate = 0.9) and decay of 10−6. A batch size of 2048 was used for speed as the data transfer to the
GPU was the bottleneck with this network. Different batch sizes had no noticeable effect classifier performance.
2.3 Baseline Testing
The baseline performance in this case refers to the network trained and tested without any obfuscation, i.e., a
conventional application of machine learning to the dataset described previously. This provides an upper limit
on performance we would expect compared to cases where the malicious samples are subsequently obfuscated
to hide their true class from the classifier. The accuracy of this network during training in plotted in Fig. 1
using different feature-types independently, and compared to using all three feature-types. The training set was
randomly-shuffled after each epoch, which may be responsible for the noisy convergence initially. The final test
accuracy, false-negative rate (FNR) and false-positive rate (FPR) are given in Figs. 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
We find that using API’s resulted in superior performance compared to intents and permissions, with a very
small improvement achieved by combining all three feature types.
2.4 Obfuscation Testing
To test the baseline network (as well as hardened networks we will describe in the next section) with obfuscated
samples, we formed new test set by randomly adding features from benign samples in the test set to the malicious
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Figure 1: Validation accuracy (percentage) during training for baseline model using different features.
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Figure 2: Accuracy percentage comparing baseline mode trained and tested on baseline datasets (blue), baseline
model trained on baseline data and tested on obfuscated data (green), model trained and tested on obfuscated
data (red).
samples in the test set. We compared using benign features from the training set instead of the test set, and
found those from the test set to result in marginally worse performance. The final obfuscated test set was the
same size as the original test set.
The obfuscated test accuracy, FNR, and FPR are also given in Figs. 2, 3, and 4, respectively. We found a
moderate reduction in accuracy (around 15 percent) and slightly-worse FPR (one or two percent), but a very
large increase in FNR (i.e., malware which has been successfully obfuscated). This is especially bad for the
previously-best-performing features, API’s, where the FNR increased from three percent to 55 percent.
2.5 Network Hardening
In order to harden the network against obfuscated features, we used data augmentation [2]. We created a
data generator which randomly produces new batches of data, by first selecting a batch of training data, then
adding features from randomly-selected benign samples to the malicious samples. Each new epoch used new
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Figure 3: False negative rate percentage (malware incorrectly classified as benign) comparing baseline mode
trained and tested on baseline datasets (blue), baseline model trained on baseline data and tested on obfuscated
data (green), model trained and tested on obfuscated data (red).
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Figure 4: False positive rate percentage (benign incorrectly classified as malware) comparing baseline mode
trained and tested on baseline datasets (blue), baseline model trained on baseline data and tested on obfuscated
data (green), model trained and tested on obfuscated data (red).
random obfuscating benign features as it cycled through batches of the training set. The training set was also
randomly shuffled after each epoch. The validation accuracy during training (note the validation data was not
obfuscated for this calculation) is plotted in Fig. 5 using different feature-types independently, and compared
to using all three feature-types. As the training data was different each epoch, we tested the ability to program
a degree invariance to benign features by running for many more epochs. However after the initial increase
inaccuracy, the subsequent improvement for many more epochs was very small. Further, this time we noted a
larger improvement in combining all feature types, versus simply using API’s.
The hardened test accuracy, FNR, and FPR using an obfuscated test set are given in Figs. 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. We found that when using all feature types we are almost able to achieve comparable performance
to the baseline network on non-obfuscated data. We again found that intents and permissions performed
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Figure 5: Validation accuracy during training with hardening for different datasets. Note that the test set is
not obfuscated here.
significantly worse when used alone as features.
3 Discussion
We considered the open and daunting problem of detecting malware subject to large (obfuscating) changes,
i.e., attacks based on adding new functionality and additional code to malware, or, in the extreme, adding
malware to benign applications. We presumed that we would nonetheless be able to extract the features of such
obfuscated malware, and so tested the ability to classify and train using augmented sets of features. We found
both that it is very easy to hide malware from a conventional deep network using this obfuscation, but also that
hardening the network against such an attack should work well. The choice of features was a very important
factor, with API’s (or API’s plus additional feature types) outperforming intents or permissions.
The data augmentation approach leads to an “invariance programming” perspective, where the goal is to
generate samples which program the network to ignore certain latent variables. In this case the latent variable
is the amount of benign features, so our network performs as an asymmetrical detector, only indicating presence
or absence of malicious features. Of course there will remain some overlap between benign and malicious
functionality, which may inform decisions on how to better secure systems by restricting functionality.
A number of new directions remain for further research. It would be useful explore the different performance
for different malware families. It would also be very valuable to be able to skip the feature extraction stage
entirely and operate directly on raw bytecode or executables. This would produce a significant increase in
dimensionality of the problem, requiring a great deal more data (including a much more sophisticated data
generator).
Appendix: Dense model summary
Model: "sequential"
_________________________________________________________________
Layer (type) Output Shape Param #
=================================================================
dense (Dense) (None , 1024) 44288000
_________________________________________________________________
dense_1 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_2 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_3 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_4 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
5
dense_5 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_6 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_7 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_8 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_9 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_10 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_11 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_12 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_13 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_14 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_15 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_16 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_17 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_18 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_19 (Dense) (None , 1024) 1049600
_________________________________________________________________
dense_20 (Dense) (None , 1) 1025
=================================================================
Total params: 64 ,231 ,425
Trainable params: 64 ,231 ,425
Non -trainable params: 0
_________________________________________________________________
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